TagRCAA(203)

In a November 1992 letter to the FAA's Northwest Mountain Region manager, the President of the Regional Commission on Airport Affairs urges the federal government to defer funding and detailed planning for a proposed third runway at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Sea-Tac). The letter argues that the Puget Sound Regional Council's ongoing regional airport system planning process must be allowed to fully evaluate all alternatives before any single project receives federal financial commitment. The author warns that proceeding prematurely with site-specific plans and an Environmental Impact Statement risks wasting federal money if the regional plan ultimately selects an alternative other than a third runway at Sea-Tac.

A 1992 report by the Regional Commission on Airport Affairs found that Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, despite occupying less than 0.2% of King County's land, was responsible for 8% of the county's carbon monoxide emissions and 5% of its nitrogen oxide emissions, along with significant quantities of toxic pollutants like benzene. At the time of the report, the airport had no air-pollution monitoring system in place, and the author argued this represented a critical gap in the airport's Environmental Impact Statement that urgently needed to be addressed.

A 1992 pamphlet published by the Regional Commission on Airport Affairs (RCAA) warns that the Port of Seattle's expansion plan for Sea-Tac Airport — including the addition of a third runway — poses serious health risks to surrounding communities. Citing studies reviewed by physicians at Highline Community Hospital, the brochure links increased airport activity to higher rates of birth defects, cardiovascular disease, mental illness, and dangerous levels of air pollutants such as carbon monoxide, benzene, and lead. The document concludes that when health and community costs are fully considered, Sea-Tac expansion may be neither financially feasible nor ethically justifiable.

These documents relate to the Airport Alternative Committee's October 1992 meeting, which brought together cities, community organizations, and citizen groups concerned about aircraft noise around Seattle-Tacoma (Sea-Tac) Airport. The committee evaluated criteria and requirements for addressing airport expansion, including minimizing noise impact on the largest number of people, maximizing aircraft and ground safety, and providing 750 operations capacity by the year 2020. Alternative airport sites such as Vancouver, Black Lake, Fort Lewis, Portland, McCord, Arlington, and SeaTac were also discussed.

A 1992 report by physicians from the Regional Coalition on Airport Affairs details the serious health risks posed by Sea-Tac International Airport's noise and air pollution on surrounding communities. It documents links between airport noise and increased use of tranquilizers, psychiatric hospitalizations, sleep disruption, lower birth weights, and declining school test scores, while also noting that Sea-Tac generates up to 5% of all air pollution in King County. The report argues that airport expansion would significantly worsen these already measurable public health impacts on South King County residents.

A 1992 report from the Health Subcommittee of the Regional Coalition on Airport Affairs argues that noise from Seattle-Tacoma International Airport poses serious health risks to nearby residents, including increased rates of psychiatric illness, sleep disruption, hypertension, and adverse birth outcomes. The report also cites 1992 measurements showing classroom noise levels exceeding 85 decibels in Highline School District schools, linking airport noise to declining standardized test scores. The authors conclude that expansion of Sea-Tac Airport would significantly worsen these documented public health impacts.

A September 1992 internal memo from Doug Graves and Len Oebser to Rick Aramburu summarizes a site visit to the Toledo-Winlock area of Washington State as a potential location for a new replacement airport. The site was praised for its large size, proximity to the I-5 freeway midway between Seattle and Portland, access to Burlington Northern rail lines, and its sparsely populated surroundings, which would minimize noise and environmental impacts. However, drawbacks noted included its distance from major population centers such as Seattle, Tacoma, Everett, and Portland, which would require some form of mass rapid transit to serve the airport effectively.

A 1992 brochure from the Regional Commission on Airport Affairs (RCAA) argues that the Port of Seattle broke its 1973 promises to soundproof homes affected by Sea-Tac Airport noise, noting that only 700 of 10,000 impacted homes had been insulated and no public buildings had been treated despite a recognized obligation since 1988. The brochure opposes the Port's plan to spend up to $1.2 billion on a third runway at Sea-Tac, questioning how residents can trust new commitments when past ones went unfulfilled. It calls on the Port to fulfill its existing mitigation obligations before pursuing further airport expansion.

In a September 1, 1992 letter to the FAA Administrator, the Regional Commission on Airport Affairs formally requests reconsideration of the FAA's August 14, 1992 decision approving Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. The Commission, representing communities near Sea-Tac severely impacted by aircraft noise, argues that PFC funds should be redirected toward noise mitigation efforts rather than security improvements and preliminary studies, and that local governments were not properly notified or consulted during the PFC application process. The letter calls for increased funding levels for noise mitigation, cancellation of certain approved expenditures deemed inappropriate or excessive, and greater consideration of local government views in future PFC allocation decisions.

This 1992 study compares three planning reports on Sea-Tac Airport's future capacity and delays: the 1988 Airspace Update Study, the 1992 Terminal Development Plan, and the 1991 Enhancement Plan. The reports differ significantly in their passenger and flight operation projections for the year 2000, and show striking discrepancies in delay estimates — with the Enhancement Plan projecting delay hours more than five times higher than the Airspace Update Study. The document also outlines proposed solutions to reduce delays, including new runway construction, airspace conflict resolution with nearby Boeing Field, and improved approach procedures.