- Development: In Codoni v. Port of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit held that the Clean Air Act preempts state-law claims seeking relief for air pollution emitted directly by aircraft, but rejected the argument that all airport-impact claims must proceed through exclusive federal review.
- Why it matters: Communities face greater limits in using state tort law to seek damages or remediation for air pollution emitted directly by aircraft, while airports and airlines gain protection from state or local aircraft-emissions standards that differ from federal requirements.
- Key Takeaway: The decision most directly affects aircraft-emissions claims. Other airport-impact disputes, including claims involving aircraft noise, will likely require a closer look at the specific claim, the defendant, and the remedy being sought.
On September 23, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a significant decision concerning federal preemption and the remedies available to communities affected by airport operations. In Codoni v. Port of Seattle, No. 25-2830, slip op. (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2026), the court held that the Clean Air Act expressly preempts state-law nuisance, trespass, negligence, and related claims seeking relief for air pollution emitted directly by aircraft. At the same time, the court rejected a much broader argument that claims involving federally regulated aviation activity necessarily constitute impermissible collateral attacks on FAA or EPA decisions. The Ninth Circuit designated the decision for publication.
The result is important for airport operators, airlines, local governments, and airport-affected communities. Codoni substantially limits the use of state tort law to obtain damages or remediation for aircraft-generated air pollution. But it does not hold that federal aviation regulation displaces all state and local remedies concerning airport impacts. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling confirms that federal regulation of aviation, standing alone, does not transform every airport-related dispute into a challenge that must be brought directly in a federal court of appeals.
The Case
The plaintiffs were residents living within five miles of Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. They brought a proposed class action against the Port of Seattle, Alaska Air Group, Inc., and Delta Air Lines, Inc., alleging that aircraft using Sea-Tac deposited particulate matter and other pollutants on surrounding communities. Their claims included negligence, battery, continuing intentional trespass, public nuisance, and inverse condemnation. They sought, among other remedies, damages, property remediation, and medical monitoring. Codoni, slip op. at 8–9.
The defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds. Among other things, they argued that the lawsuit was an improper collateral attack on federal agency actions subject to exclusive appellate review under 49 U.S.C. § 46110 and the Clean Air Act. They also argued that the state-law claims were federally preempted.
The district court rejected those arguments but certified its decision for interlocutory appeal. The Ninth Circuit reversed on preemption grounds.
Federal Regulation Does Not Automatically Eliminate District-Court Jurisdiction
One of the most important aspects of Codoni may be the argument the Ninth Circuit rejected.
Under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, federal courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review certain final FAA orders. Related precedent prevents litigants from circumventing that exclusive-review provision by bringing district-court claims that are “inescapably intertwined” with review of the procedures or merits of a federal agency order.
The defendants argued that the residents’ claims necessarily implicated numerous federal decisions governing aircraft emissions, flight paths, runway use, aircraft design, fuel, and other aspects of aviation. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this was not enough.
The court emphasized that § 46110 does not give the courts of appeals jurisdiction over “every possible dispute involving FAA.” Codoni, slip op. at 16. The collateral-attack doctrine instead requires a connection to a particular agency action whose procedures or merits the plaintiff is effectively challenging. Here, the residents challenged a broader course of conduct rather than an identifiable FAA or EPA order.
The court also rejected the argument that jurisdiction disappears merely because litigation might eventually require consideration of an FAA-approved flight path or potentially result in relief affecting federally regulated activity. At the pleading stage, claims that can proceed without challenging a particular federal order are not converted into collateral attacks merely because some possible theories or remedies might ultimately conflict with federal action.
That holding is potentially significant beyond aircraft-emissions litigation. Airport operators and airlines cannot establish exclusive federal appellate jurisdiction simply by pointing to the pervasive federal regulation of aviation. Where a state-law claim does not seek to invalidate or circumvent an identifiable FAA order, Codoni confirms that § 46110 does not automatically deprive the district court of jurisdiction.
State Tort Law Cannot Establish a Separate Aircraft-Emissions Standard
The residents nevertheless lost because of a different form of federal preemption.
Section 233 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7573, prohibits a state or political subdivision from adopting or enforcing any “standard respecting emissions of any air pollutant from any aircraft or engine thereof” unless the state standard is identical to an applicable federal standard.
The Ninth Circuit interpreted that language broadly. A state “standard,” the court held, can include duties imposed through state common law, not merely statutes and regulations. The statutory phrase “respecting emissions” also gives the provision broad reach. Codoni, slip op. at 18–20.
Because the residents’ negligence, battery, trespass, nuisance, and inverse-condemnation theories arose from aircraft emissions, allowing recovery would effectively enforce state-law duties “respecting emissions.” The claims therefore fell within § 7573’s express-preemption provision.
The residents could not avoid preemption by characterizing their claims as seeking compensation or cleanup after pollutants reached their properties rather than regulation of the original emissions. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the failure-to-clean-up theory remained sufficiently connected to aircraft emissions to fall within the statute.
The Court Leaves Open Claims Based on Violations of Federal Standards
The decision does not foreclose every state-law claim concerning aircraft emissions.
Section 7573 permits state standards that are identical to applicable federal aircraft-emission standards. Consistent with that language, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the statute does not preempt state-law actions enforcing duties that parallel applicable federal emissions requirements.
That exception did not help the Codoni plaintiffs because their complaint did not allege that the airlines were violating any federal emissions standard. Plaintiffs’ counsel explained at oral argument that the omission was deliberate because plaintiffs did not believe they possessed sufficient supporting evidence. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the failure to allege a violation of an applicable federal standard was fatal to the complaint as pleaded. Codoni, slip op. at 23–24.
The practical viability of this avenue will therefore depend upon whether a plaintiff can identify an applicable federal aircraft-emissions requirement and plausibly allege its violation.
What Codoni Means for Aircraft Noise and Other Airport Impacts
Although Codoni concerns air pollution rather than aircraft noise, the decision is likely to figure prominently in future aviation-preemption disputes.
The court’s reasoning that common-law damages can function as a regulatory “standard” may strengthen arguments that nuisance or trespass claims brought directly against airlines can impermissibly regulate federally controlled aircraft operations. But Codoni does not decide that issue. Its express-preemption holding rests on the particular language of Clean Air Act § 233, and the court expressly declined to reach the defendants’ separate Airline Deregulation Act and implied-preemption defenses.
Nor does Codoni overturn the established line of aircraft-noise cases recognizing state-law remedies against airport proprietors. In Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), the Supreme Court imposed takings liability on the airport proprietor for low-altitude aircraft operations affecting neighboring property. Eleven years later, the Supreme Court held in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973), that federal regulation preempted a municipality’s attempt to impose its own aircraft-noise curfew, while recognizing the distinct position occupied by an airport proprietor.
California courts subsequently developed that distinction. In Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that federal control over aircraft operations did not eliminate state-law damages remedies against the proprietor of Los Angeles International Airport. And in Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, 39 Cal. 3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 218 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1985), the court reiterated that state-law damage remedies remain available against an airport proprietor notwithstanding federal control over commercial flight patterns and schedules. The latter citation and holding are confirmed by the California Supreme Court’s published opinion.
The Ninth Circuit similarly distinguished federal control of the source of aircraft noise from measures addressing its effects in San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981). That distinction—between regulating the aircraft or its operation as the source of an environmental impact and providing remedies for the effects of airport operations—may become increasingly important after Codoni.
Practical Implications
For airport-affected communities, Codoni makes state nuisance and trespass litigation a substantially more difficult vehicle for addressing air pollution generated directly by aircraft. Communities may need to place greater emphasis on participation in FAA and EPA administrative proceedings, environmental review under NEPA and analogous state laws, challenges to particular federal actions where appropriate, and claims against airport proprietors that fall outside the federally preempted field.
For airports and airlines, the decision provides significant protection against state-law efforts to impose aircraft-emissions requirements different from federal standards. But the decision should not be read as establishing blanket immunity from state and local law. The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the proposition that pervasive federal aviation regulation by itself removes airport-related disputes from district-court jurisdiction.
The larger lesson from Codoni is therefore more nuanced than simply “federal preemption.” Courts will look closely at what conduct a state-law claim actually regulates, who is being regulated, and whether the requested remedy establishes a state standard within a field Congress has reserved to federal control.
For aircraft noise in particular, Codoni reinforces the importance of distinguishing between a claim that seeks to impose liability directly on an airline for the consequences of federally regulated flight operations and a claim seeking compensation from an airport proprietor for the effects of operating the airport. Existing precedent provides substantially stronger support for the latter. Codoni does not resolve that distinction, but it makes it more important.
Key Takeaways
- Aircraft-emissions claims are expressly preempted. Codoni holds that Clean Air Act § 233 preempts state-law nuisance, trespass, negligence, and similar claims that would impose standards concerning emissions from aircraft, including claims seeking damages or cleanup.
- Federal aviation regulation does not automatically eliminate state-law claims. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that pervasive FAA and EPA regulation makes every airport-impact lawsuit an impermissible collateral attack on federal agency action. Exclusive appellate review requires a sufficient connection to a particular agency order.
- The decision is important, but not controlling, for aircraft-noise claims. Codoni addresses the Clean Air Act’s express aircraft-emissions preemption provision, not aircraft-noise preemption. It does not disturb existing precedent preserving damages remedies against airport proprietors for aircraft-noise impacts, although its treatment of common-law damages as potentially regulatory may strengthen preemption arguments against claims brought directly against airlines.
Leech Tishman has extensive experience advising clients on aviation and aerospace matters, including airport operations, regulatory issues, federal preemption, and airport-impact disputes. Our team can help aviation stakeholders evaluate how the Codoni decision may affect aircraft-emissions claims and related airport-impact disputes. For assistance or additional information, please contact Steven M. Taber at staber@leechtishman.com, Partner in Leech Tishman’s Aviation & Aerospace Group.