You can’t follow the game without a program
Financing the Third Runway was unlike any other airport expansion–including the SAMP. In order to obtain federal funding, the Port was required to obtain an elaborate set of approvals from a regional agency most people are unfamiliar with–the Puget Sound Regional Council. In the broadest possible strokes, the PSRC provides funding from the federal government for transportation projects. Could it get more complicated? Of course it could. When the process began, the agency was known as PSCOG. For this article, we’ll refer to it as ‘PSRC’.
It is the will of Congress that states provide transportation forecasts and capacity adequate to meet the needs of the nation. The PSRC was tasked with both for the Central Puget Sound. To do that they created three Expert Panels: Second Airport, High Speed Rail, Third Runway. The first two panels never convened as it was clear that neither option was feasible.
The Third Runway panel was tasked with evaluating the Port’s proposed mitigation plan. The various cities fighting the Third Runway (collectively known as the ACC) played an active role in the Expert Panel’s work.
Why this matters today
- The Expert Panel was backward-facing. It was considering the changes since the Second Runway as much as possible increases from new construction. (If not, why sound insulate so many homes not directly under the new runway?)
- The Expert Panel process quantified the mitigation. It turned the process into a negotiation. How many homes? Where? How much noise reduction? On what timeline? Those were the right questions to ask. The ACC correctly pointed out that the Port’s offer was weak. But the Port was required to have something specific to respond to.
In contrast
- The SAMP requires no such independent funding approval. From day one, airport planners work with the FAA to develop a plan that will meet regulatory requirements.
- The SAMP is forward-facing. It has no obligation under either NEPA or SEPA to consider the implications of both their marketing efforts, or construction since the Third Runway, including major projects such as the North and South Satellite rebuilds and the International Arrivals Facility.
What went wrong
In a sharply divided 2-1 decision, the panel’s Final Report rejects the Port’s plan in fairly scathing language. The ACC/RCAA and community groups considered this a major victory. But the recommendations of the Expert Panel were never meant to permanently stop the Third Runway. Like any sincere mediation, they were meant to prod both sides to obtain a better agreement.
The PSRC re-convened and amended A-93-03 to include the recommendations of the panel–and move forward with construction.
The PSRC can be faulted for not pushing the Port of Seattle to do better. But not for their decision to proceed with construction. Even if they had held up construction for ten more years there was absolutely no political will to create transportation alternatives to meet their statutory mandate–providing adequate capacity to meet the region’s needs.
The agreed upon system was better than the Port’s initial offer. But there was no accountability piece–the panel’s report did not specify that. And the ACC had neither the will or the funds to press. They were trying to stop construction.
In a better world, the ACC and PSRC would have mandated funding for that accountability piece. They had the leverage to provide firm targets and an audit procedure to make sure that every eligible home received sound insulation and that the work was done properly. Instead, the Port was left with wiggle-room to provide mitigation based on ‘available funds’ and with little oversight on project quality and long-term outreach.