

1	II. STATEMENT OF FACTS		
2	In reviewing a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the		
3	factual allegations of the complaint. Berge v. Gorton, 88 Wn.2d 756, 759, 567 P.2d 187		
4	(1977). All of the facts relevant to this motion are contained in Petitioners Airport		
5	Communities Coalition's and Citizens Against Sea-Tac Expansion's (collectively, "ACC's")		's")
6	Petition for Review of Agency Action. Those relevant facts, which the Port does not		
7	challenge, are as follows:		
8	•	On August 10, 2001, the Washington Department of Ecology ("Ecology"))
9		issued an order that included a § 401 Water Quality Certification ("401	
10		Certification") for the Port of Seattle's proposed third runway at the Seatt	tle-
11		Tacoma International Airport. [Petition, ¶ 6.7.]	
12	•	On August 23, 2001, ACC filed its notice of appeal of the 401 Certification	on to
13		the Pollution Control Hearing Board ("PCHB"). [Petition, ¶ 6.7.] On	
14		September 12, 2001, ACC filed its Motion to Stay the Effectiveness of the	e
15		Certification. [Petition, ¶ 6.8.]	
16	•	On September 21, 2001, Ecology issued a revised 401 Certification. [Petit	tion,
17		¶ 6.10.] ACC filed a Notice of Appeal of the revised 401 Certification on	
18		October 1, 2001. [Petition, ¶ 6.11.]	
19	•	On November 26, 2001, the PCHB issued an Order on Motion to Reconsi	der
20		Motion to Strike, ruling that a particular document obtained by ACC throu	ıgh
21		the Public Disclosure Act and offered in support of ACC's Motion for Sta	ay
22		was privileged. [Petition, ¶ 6.12.]	
23	•	On December 17, 2001, the PCHB issued an Order on Motion to Supplem	nent
24		the Record, denying ACC's motion to introduce additional documents it	
25		obtained through the Public Disclosure Act into the record in support of it	ts
26		Motion for Stay. [Petition, ¶ 6.13.]	505′
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1	 Also on December 17, 2001, the PCHB entered an Order Granting Motion to 		
2	Stay the Effectiveness of the Section 401 Certification. The PCHB's ruling		
3	granted the relief sought by ACC on three of the five grounds requested,		
4	without addressing the remaining two grounds. [Petition, ¶ 6.14.]		
5	• On December 31, 2001, prior to ACC's filing of its Petition for Review, the		
6	Port of Seattle ("Port") filed a Petition for Review of Agency Action asking the		
7	Court to reverse the PCHB's order granting the stay. That action is currently		
8	pending under Thurston County Superior Court Cause No. 01-2-02386-9.		
9	[Petition, ¶ 7.1.]		
10	By this action, ACC now seeks judicial review of the PCHB order in which its Motion		
11	for Stay was granted. It asks the Court to enter an order "affirming" the PCHB's Order on		
12	Motion for Stay. [Petition, ¶ 8.2.] ACC also requests that the Court set aside the PCHB's		
13	Order on Motion to Reconsider Motion to Strike and the PCHB's Order on Motion to		
14	Supplement the Record. [Petition, ¶ 8.1.]		
15	III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY		
16	A. Standard of Review Under Civil Rule 12(b)(6).		
17	The purpose of Civil Rule 12(b)(6) is to enable a defendant to challenge the legal		
18	sufficiency of a complaint on its face. The court should dismiss a claim pursuant to CR		
19	12(b)(6) where there is no rule of law giving the plaintiff a right of action. Taylor v. Stevens		
20	County, 111 Wn.2d 159, 172, 759 P.2d 447 (1988); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76		
21	Wn.2d 759, 760-61, 458 P.2d 897 (1969). In other words, where "the plaintiff can prove no		
22	set of facts, consistent with [his] complaint, which would entitle him to relief," dismissal of		
23	the complaint is appropriate. Bravo v. Dolsen Companies, 125 Wn.2d 745, 750, 888 P.2d		
24	147 (1995).		
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27	Altoo		
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1	B. Petitioners Fail to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.		
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	The jurisdiction of a Washington superior court to review orders by an administrative		
5	agency is "vested only in the manner specified by law." Woodard v. Department of Labor		
6	and Industries, 188 Wn. 93, 97, 61 P.2d 1003 (1936) (citations omitted). Under RCW		
7	43.21B.320, which governs judicial review of stays ordered by the PCHB, only a party		
8	"aggrieved by the grant or denial of stay" may petition for review. The PCHB granted ACC's		
9	motion for stay, although the order granting the stay mentioned only three of the five grounds		
10	raised in the motion. [Petition, ¶ 7.2.] ACC's Petition for Review is therefore premised on		
11	the strange theory that a party granted the full measure of relief it sought through agency		
12	action nonetheless qualifies as an "aggrieved" party. More specifically, ACC contends that it		
13	is entitled by this action to an "affirmation" of the PCHB's favorable ruling because the Board		
14	engaged in an "unlawful procedure or decision-making process" by failing to discuss two of the		
15	five grounds on which the ruling was sought.		
16	ACC has no such right. Washington case law establishes the fundamental—and		
17	logical—principle that a party that prevails in a specific administrative action is not aggrieved.		
18	See, e.g., Woodard v. Department of Labor and Industries, 188 Wn. 93, 61 P.2d 1003 (1936)		
19	(one who successfully applies for a finding of disability and an appropriate award of benefits		
20	is not "aggrieved" and can not appeal to the superior court); Carnation Co. v. Hill, 54 Wn.		
21	App. 806, 810, 776 P.2d 158 (1989), affirmed, 115 Wn.2d 184, 796 P.2d 416 (1990)		
22	(characterizing a successful applicant to the industrial appeals board as "not aggrieved").		
23	In a longstanding decision, the Washington Supreme Court has spoken on the specific		
24	issue of aggrieved parties and the right to appeal. In Elterich v. Arndt, 175 Wn. 562, 27 P.2d		
25	1102 (1933), the Court asserted,		
26	It is essential, in order that a person may appeal or sue out a		
27	writ of error, that he shall be aggrieved or prejudiced by the judgment or decree; appeals are not allowed for the purpose of		
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1	settling abstract questions, however interesting or important to
2	the public generally, but only to correct errors injuriously affecting the appellant. The record must show that the party
3	complaining was aggrieved by the judgment, as a reviewing court
4	cannot hear evidence to determine that question. The damage or grievance which entitles a party to a writ of error or an appeal
5	must be a direct and positive one, affected by the judgment
6	concluding and acting upon his rights; and such damage must be by the record, and not in consequence of it.
7	Id. at 563 – 64 [emphasis supplied].
8	In short, this Court cannot hear evidence on an "abstract question" not "injuriously
9	affecting" an appellant. The stay ordered by the PCHB has not "injuriously affected" ACC,
10	which moved for precisely the relief afforded by the PCHB's Order. ACC now seeks
11	"affirmation" of that ruling, not reversal nor any modification whatsoever. Moreover, ACC
12	expressly premises its Petition on what it alleges to be "unlawful action" by the PCHB,
13	specifically its failure to consider alternative grounds for the relief sought in ACC's Motion
14	for Stay. Such action, unlawful or not, is certainly "abstract." Even if one were to assume
15	that the PCHB did not rule specifically on two of ACC's grounds for a stay, the PCHB's
16	decision to grant the relief sought on three of the five grounds raised rendered the remaining
17	grounds moot. Whether relief could or should have been granted based on those remaining
18	grounds is a purely theoretical and abstract—and unnecessary—question to answer.
19	The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Ohnstad v. City of Tacoma, 64 Wn.2d
20	904, 395 P.2d 97 (1964), perhaps best reveals the flaw in ACC's Petition for Review. In that
21	case, retired employees of a municipal transit company acquired by the City of Tacoma sued
22	the City for pension benefits. The trial court held that the City in acquiring the company had
23	succeeded to the contractual obligations owed by the company to plaintiffs, and that based on
24	the terms of the contract the City owed no further obligation to contribute to the pension
25	fund. The employees appealed. The Washington Supreme Court, relying on the terms of the
26	contract, affirmed the ruling. In so doing, the Court refused to consider the "numerous

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1	constitutional issues raised" by the City as additional arguments in defense of the appeal. The		
2	Court stated:		
3	With reference to the appeal of the City, it would appear that it		
4	is not really aggrieved as to the result, but desires to have the		
5	case disposed of in its favor on one or more of the numerous constitutional issues it has raised [W]e see no reason why		
6	we should extend this opinion by some 15 pages to deal with the constitutional issues raised (at the expense of all of the		
7	lawyers who purchase these reports), absent any necessity		
8	therefore. If we dispose of this case by assuming, without deciding, that the City is wrong in each of its contentions		
9	relative to [constitutional provisions] and concerning the		
10	unconstitutionality of any payments it might make for the benefit of the plaintiffs, we still reach a result which negates any		
11	present liability of the City		
12	Id. at 906-07. Essentially, the Court ruled that the City won, and was not entitled to a bigger,		
13	better win on additional grounds. It therefore refused to consider additional grounds for the		
14	ruling "unless absolutely necessary to a determination of the appeal." It held that its ruling		
15	"render[ed] unnecessary a consideration" of the constitutional arguments raised. Id. at 907		
16	[Citations omitted.]		
17	The Ohnstad decision and the other cases discussed above confirm that it is the very		
18	design of CR 12(b)(6) to reserve judicial action for legally cognizable claims and to provide		
19	courts the means to conserve costs and promote judicial economy by dismissing actions		
20	presenting no factual or legal basis for relief. Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829		
21	F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). One court has characterized a trial court's failure to dismiss a		
22	complaint that does not establish the requisite elements of the cause of action as an		
23	"abdication of judicial responsibility" because of the wasted time and costs required for		
24	discovery and trial. Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 553 (7th Cir.		
25	1980). This Court should not entertain ACC's theoretical and abstract arguments to "affirm"		
26	a ruling made in its favor.		

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1	2. ACC's Request That the Court Set Aside the PCHB's Order on Motion to Reconsider Motion to Strike and Order on Motion to Supplement the Record		
2	Fails to State a Cognizable Claim.		
3	In its Petition for Review, ACC alleges, albeit wrongly, that RCW 43.21B.320 entitle		
4	it to judicial review of the PCHB's Order Granting Stay. The Petition fails, however, to offe		
5	any factual or legal support for its claim that this Court's review of the PCHB's November		
6	26, 2001, Order on Motion to Reconsider Motion to Strike and December 17, 2001, Order or		
7	Motion to Supplement the Record is proper. [See Petition, Section VI "Facts Entitling		
8	Petitioners to Judicial Review, and Section VII "Reasons Relief Should Be Granted."] ACC's		
9	failure to even assert in its Petition a recognized legal basis for review of itself warrants		
10	dismissal of these components of the Petition and this action under CR 12(b)(6). Further, a		
11	simple evaluation of those motions leads to the inescapable conclusion that review of these		
12	agency rulings is neither justified nor necessary.		
13	In its Motion to Reconsider Motion to Strike, ACC asked the PCHB to consider a		
14	memo obtained through the Public Disclosure Act in conjunction with the board's evaluation		
15	of its Motion for Stay. The PCHB ruled that the document was privileged and therefore		
16	denied the motion. [Petition, ¶ 6.12.] In its Motion to Supplement the Record, ACC asked		
17	the PCHB to consider additional documents pertaining to the Port's low stream flow analysis		
18	and mitigation proposal in conjunction with the board's evaluation of its Motion for Stay.		
19	The PCHB determined that "[r]eopening the record would not have provided the Board new		
20	information" and therefore denied the motion. [Petition, ¶ 613; Order on Motion to		
21	Supplement the Record, attached as Exhibit C to ACC's Petition.] As discussed above, after		
22	issuing its ruling on these motions, the PCHB entered its Order Granting Stay.		
23	The critical fact is that both evidentiary Orders on which ACC now seeks this Court's		
24	review asked the PCHB to consider factual information supporting ACC's Motion for Stay.		
25	Because the PCHB granted the stay motion, whether the additional information would have		
26	further supported the ruling is a theoretical and abstract question improper for review by this		
27	Court. See Section III(B)(1), supra. The documents ACC sought unsuccessfully to introduce		
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1	in support of its Motion for Stay are no different than the additional grounds for relief raised				
2	by ACC but not reached by the board. Just as those additional grounds for stay provide no				
3	basis for judicial review, the PCHB's rulings on evidence considered in granting the stay				
4	provide no such basis.				
5	IV. CONCLUSION				
6	Because the PCHB's Order Granting Stay afforded ACC the full measure of relief it				
7	sought, ACC does not qualify as an "aggrieved" party under Washington law and is therefore				
8	not entitled to judicial review under RCW 43.21B.320. The Court should dismiss this action				
9	with prejudice on the grounds that ACC's request for an "affirmation" of the PCHB's Order				
10	Granting Stay, and its request to set aside two evidentiary orders, fail to state a cognizable				
11	claim.				
12	Respectfully submitted this 16 day of January, 2002.				
13					
14	PORT OF SEATTLE	FOSTER PEPPER & SHEFELMAN PLLC			
15	6 A	A 0 .			
16	larya Darrett for	Tanja Garrett for			
17	Linda J. Strout, General Counsel, WSBA No. 9422	Roger A. Pearce, WSBA No. 21113 Steven G. Jones, WSBA No. 19334			
18	Traci M. Goodwin, Senior Port Counsel,	bieven d. vones, weblind. 1983			
19	WSBA No. 14974				
20		MARTEN BROWN INC.			
21		Jan B. H.			
22		Jay J. Manning, WSBA No. 13579			
23		Gillis E. Reavis, WSBA No. 21451			
24					
25					
26					
27					
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